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SHOULD COMMISSION OF A
CONTEMPORANEOUS ARSON, BURGLARY,
KIDNAPPING, RAPE, OR ROBBERY BE
SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A MURDERER ELIGIBLE
FOR A DEATH SENTENCE?-AN EMPIRICAL
AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
By David McCord*
INTRODUCTION
Most death penalty jurisdictions make a murderer death-
eligible if the murder was committed contemporaneously with
one of five felonies: arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, or
robbery.1 In recent years, however, this traditional approach
has been challenged by two blue-ribbon panels-the Illinois
Commission on Capital Punishment and the Massachusetts
Governor's Council on Capital Punishment-both of which
advocated abolition of these five felonies as death-eligibility
aggravators.2 The stakes in this debate are high because
these five felonies-hereinafter "the contemporaneous
felonies"-are frequent companions of murder: over sixty
percent of death-eligible defendants contemporaneously
commit at least one of them,3 and robbery alone qualifies
more murderers for death-eligibility than any other
* Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; J.D. Harvard Law School,
1978; B.A. Illinois Wesleyan University, 1975. For this project that stretched
from 2004 to 2008, I have many people to thank: my current administrative
assistant Elizabeth Tigges and my former administrative assistant Karla
Westberg; my current research assistant Kyle Hanson and my former research
assistants Brooke Burrage, Richard Mortensen, Clarissa Rodriguez, Daniel
Slimak, and Beth Tigges; Camille L. Zentner, Esq.; and the Drake University
Law School for a summer research stipend in support of the project.
1. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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aggravating circumstance.4 Yet neither of these blue-ribbon
panels engaged in any significant empirical inquiry
concerning the real-world impact such abolition would have
on the universe of death-eligible defendants. This article
seeks to fill that void. Further, both blue-ribbon panels
accepted the traditional model-which will herein be termed
the "one-aggravator-is-sufficient-and-all-are-equal model"-of
death-eligibility, of which the contemporaneous felonies are
examples. By contrast, this article will challenge the
traditional model and argue for a weighted, multi-factor
death-eligibility model.
The article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the
concept of "depravity factors," that is, all the factors that
make a murder worse than a "normal" murder so that it
might be considered as a candidate for a death penalty
prosecution, and explains how such factors relate to statutory
aggravating circumstances, including the contemporaneous
felonies. Part II explains the law relating to the
contemporaneous felonies as aggravators by providing a short
history of the use of contemporaneous felonies as bases for
death-eligibility, and canvassing the contemporaneous felony
aggravating circumstances of every jurisdiction. Part III
examines the rationales of both the traditional position that
any of the contemporaneous felonies should suffice, and the
Illinois and Massachusetts panels' conclusions that none of
the contemporaneous felonies should suffice.
Part IV constitutes the innovative heart of the article.
There I examine a database consisting of all the death-
eligible defendants I could find nationwide whose sentences
were decided during the two-year period 2004 to 2005-a
total of 1128 of them, including all 286 defendants who were
sentenced to death.5 This database enables a description of
how the elimination of contemporaneous felonies as death-
eligibility aggravators would affect the universe of death-
eligible defendants. I also undertake a normative analysis of
4. See infra fig.2 and accompanying text.
5. See David McCord, Should Commission of a Contemporaneous Arson,
Burglary, Kidnapping, Rape, or Robbery Be Sufficient to Make a Murderer
Eligible for a Death Sentence?-An Empirical and Normative Analysis, 49
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 app. A, pt. 1 (2009),
http://facstaff.law.drake.edu/david.mccord/mcCordAppendix.html, for a
narrative summary for each of these defendants.
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whether eliminating contemporaneous felonies as
aggravators would be a good idea within the context of the
current one-aggravator-is-sufficient-and-all-are-equal model.
Following up in Part V, I broaden the discussion to
address the real problem: the flawed premise of the one-
aggravator-is-sufficient-and-all-are-equal model that death-
eligibility is best determined by using a list of equally-
weighted aggravators-whether contemporaneous felonies or
others-any one of which is sufficient to confer death-
eligibility. This model allows prosecutors to push for the
death penalty for many relatively commonplace murders,
rather than only for the most depraved murders. Instead, I
will propose a model that allows for consideration of all
depravity factors in the eligibility determination, including
contemporaneous felonies, but requires an accumulation of
them for death-eligibility.
Before beginning the analysis, several introductory
explanations are in order. First, it is important to
understand that death sentencing involves two separate
determinations: the "eligibility decision" and the "selection
decision."6  The eligibility decision determines whether a
defendant is within that pool of murderers for whom a death
sentence is an option, which hinges on whether a statutorily-
defined aggravating circumstance is proven. In every case,
two different actors make an eligibility decision. The
prosecutor makes a predictive eligibility decision by seeking a
death sentence, thereby manifesting a belief that the trier-of-
fact-usually a jury'-will find the defendant death-eligible.
The jury then makes the actual eligibility decision by finding
6. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994) ("Our capital
punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two different aspects
of the capital decisionmaking process: the eligibility decision and the selection
decision. To be eligible for the death penalty, the defendant must be convicted
of a crime for which the death penalty is a proportionate punishment. To
render a defendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, we have
indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find
one 'aggravating circmnstance' (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty
phase .... We have imposed a separate requirement for the selection decision,
where the sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible for the death
penalty should in fact receive that sentence. 'What is important at the selection
stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime.'" (citations omitted)).
7. I will use the term "jury" throughout the article rather than the more
cumbersome "trier-of-fact."
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that an aggravating circumstance exists. The selection
decision determines whether a defendant who has been found
to be death-eligible should receive a death sentence. A
selection decision is constitutionally necessary because the
Supreme Court has held that mandatory death sentences are
unconstitutional.' Again, the prosecutor makes a predictive
selection decision by choosing to pursue a death sentence
through to the penalty-phase verdict; the jury makes the
actual selection decision at the end of the penalty phase. In
most jurisdictions the eligibility and selection decisions are
submitted to the jury simultaneously, to be determined in the
same deliberative process.9  The two decisions are,
nonetheless, sequential: if the defendant is determined not to
be death-eligible then there is no need for the selection
decision. This article pertains almost exclusively to the
eligibility decision.
Second, I will work from the premise that the goal of any
death penalty system is to limit death-eligibility to the "worst
of the worst" murderers. This assumption has only partial
constitutional support inasmuch as the United States
Supreme Court has held that death sentences can only be
imposed on murderers who are somehow worse than "normal"
murderers, but has not required that they be among the
"worst of the worst."1 °  Nonetheless, there is a compelling
8. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding
mandatory death sentence for first-degree murder unconstitutional as cruel and
unusual punishment); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 79, 85 (1987)
(holding mandatory death sentence for murder by a prisoner already serving a
life-without-parole sentence unconstitutional as cruel and unusual
punishment).
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) ("[Tlhe concerns expressed in
Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious
manner ... are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding.
• ..") (approving the "bifurcated trial" process). At least one court, however, has
required a trifurcated procedure: a guilt-innocence phase, a death-eligibility
phase, and then if death-eligibility is found, a death selection phase. See United
States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1111 (N.D. Iowa, 2005); see also
Donald M. Houser, Note, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure
of the Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 349 (2007). Also, California requires trifurcation if the defendant
presents a claim to the jury to be exempt from death-eligibility due to mental
retardation. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West 2007) (stating that if guilt is
found, jury then considers sole issue whether defendant is mentally retarded; if
jury finds no retardation, jury moves to the death-selection phase).
10. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-69 (2005) ("Capital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category
[Vo1:49
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penological justification for limiting death-eligibility to the
"worst of the worst": public support for capital punishment is
primarily based on retributive and denunciation principles,
and particularly blameworthy murderers are the ones to
whom those rationales most strongly apply.11 Further, there
is a powerful practical justification for the "worst of the
worst" standard-the justice system simply has limited
capacity to handle enormously resource-intensive death
penalty cases.12 I am not alone in working from the "worst of
of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most
deserving of execution.' . . . Three general differences between juveniles under
18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders." (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
319 (2002))). A recent dissent marks the first time that any Supreme Court
Justices have embraced the "worst of the worst" principle. See Kansas v.
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[W]ithin the category
of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for 'the worst of the worst.'
"1).
11. See David McCord, Imagining a Retributive Alternative to Capital
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 26-37 (1998) (arguing this proposition at length,
and concluding that jurors choose death sentences "primarily to vindicate their
need for retribution, both in the sense of causing offenders to suffer the most
serious penalty for the most serious crimes, and to express the sentencers'
feeling that the offenders' crimes are so far beyond the pale as to warrant a
higher expression of outrage than even 'standard' murders").
12. Examining the most recent three years for which data are available
(2004-2006), an average of 137 death sentences were imposed (146 in 2004, 140
in 2005, and 124 in 2006). See American Judicature Society, Capital Case Data
Project, http://www.ajs.org/jc/deatbJjc-death.asp (2008) (providing links to
databases compiling all death sentences for 2004 through 2006 and
summarizing the facts of each). In most jurisdictions the death sentencing rate
in cases that reach a decision on the sentencing phase is between twenty-five
and fifty percent, although the rate in the very active death penalty jurisdiction
of Texas is much higher. See Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An
Actuarial Risk Assessment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1253 (2000) ("States in which jurors are
directed to weigh specified aggravating and mitigating factors have average
jury death sentencing rates ranging from approximately one-fourth to one-half
that of life sentences. In Texas, over three-fourths of all capital trials brought
before juries during penalty trials between 1974 and 1988 resulted in death
sentences."). For a rough calculation I will assume a forty percent rate across
the country of death sentences for cases that reach a penalty phase
determination. Assuming that the system is operating at relatively full
capacity as to cases that reach the penalty phase, that means the system in the
past three years had the capacity to handle about 340 penalty phase cases a
year. My research has found that death-eligible cases that are plea-bargained
likely outnumber those that reach the penalty phase by at least fifty percent,
which means there are at least about another 500 death-eligible cases in the
system each year, for a total of about 840 per year (340 going to penalty phase;
500 plea-bargained). I hypothesize that this constitutes about the upper limit of
6 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:49
the worst" premise. In recent years there is a developing
consensus among both scholars and death penalty litigators
that the phrase "worst of the worst" correctly describes the
category of murderers who should be death-eligible. 13 As a
rough approximation, the "worst of the worst" designation
should describe less than ten percent of murderers, and
probably closer to five percent. 14 Of course, aggravators tell
death penalty cases the justice system can adjudicate per year.
13. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-26
(2007) ("[O]ne could easily conclude that mentally retarded individuals, who by
definition had 'significantly subaverage' intellectual function, were not among
the 'worst of the worst' for whom death was appropriate." (citing Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 343-48 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))); Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death
Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study,
59 FLA. L. REV. 719, 722-23 (2007) ("In combination, the principles require
states to limit death-eligibility to defendants who commit a narrow category of
the most serious crimes, the worst of the worst, because the culpability of the
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available
to the State." (internal quotations omitted)); Note, The Rhetoric of Difference
and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1604 n.4
(2001) ("Like the phrase 'death is different,' 'the worst of the worst' peppers
death penalty literature." (citations omitted)); Kate Braser, Wilkes' Jury
Deadlocked, Punishment Decision Turned over to the Judge, EVANSVILLE
COURIER, Dec. 15, 2007, at Al (discussing a death penalty case in which defense
counsel argued the defendant was " 'not the worst of the worst' " while the
prosecution argued the defendant was " 'worse than the worst of the worst' ");
Tyeesha Dixon, Morris Apologizes to Slain Officer's Family, Convicted Killer
Awaits Word on Judge's Sentence, BALT. SUN, Jan. 25, 2008, at 1B (noting that
a capital defense attorney "argued that the death penalty should be reserved for
the 'worst of the worst' and that sentencing all murderers to death is arcane
legal philosophy"); Tiara M. Ellis, Sentence for Agent's Killer Considered:
McKinney Jury Convicts Man, Now Must Decide Between Life Term, Death,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 11, 2007, at 8B (involving a case in which the
prosecution contended: " 'If the death penalty is reserved for the worst of the
worst, I believe [the defendant] has earned himself a front-row seat.' ").
14. For the most recent three years for which data are available, an average
of about 16,500 murders per year were committed in the United States. See
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES tbl. 7 (2006), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_07.html. About thirteen percent of
the U.S. population lives in non-death-penalty states, however. Assuming that
the percentage of murders in non-death-penalty states equals their population
share, I must subtract thirteen percent of 16,500 to arrive at an estimate of the
number of homicides in death penalty states: 14,355. Assuming my calculation
of a systemic maximum of about 840 death penalty cases per year that can be
handled through penalty phase decisions and plea bargains, see supra, note 12,
the 840 represents 5.9% of the estimated 14,355 homicides each year in death
penalty states. Indeed, the force of my argument later is that the percentage of
murderers who should be death-eligible should be even smaller because the
current one-aggravator-is-sufficient-and-all-are-equal model over-includes
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only half the story of whether a murderer is among the "worst
of the worst"-mitigating evidence presents the other half of
the story, and it may be sufficient to dispel the conclusion
that the defendant is one of the "worst of the worst" despite
substantial aggravation. Mitigating evidence is, however,
pertinent to the selection decision, not to the eligibility
decision, and thus will not concern us here.
Third, while many jurisdictions have degrees of each
contemporaneous felony, this article means to refer to the
highest degree of each felony, which invariably is the degree
involved in death-eligible murders. Briefly put, for arson this
means burning of an occupied structure; 5 for burglary, the
forcible invasion of a residence; 6 for kidnapping, forcibly
taking or holding the victim against the victim's will for an
unlawful purpose; 7 for rape, forcible sexual contact against
the victim's will;18 and for robbery, the armed variety. 9
Fourth, herein the use of the terms "aggravating
circumstances" or "aggravators" refers to any statutory
defendants within the death-eligible category.
15. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1401 (West 2007) ("Any person who
willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns . . . any building or structure or
contents thereof, inhabited or occupied by one or more persons . . . shall be
guilty of arson in the first degree .... ").
16. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(a) (2007) ("A person is guilty of
burglary [a felony of the first degree] if he enters a building or occupied
structure [adapted for overnight accommodation], or a separately secured or
occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a crime therein, unless the
premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged
to enter.").
17. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.110(5) (West 2007) ("A person commits
the crime of kidnapping if he or she unlawfully removes another without his or
her consent from the place where he or she is found . . . for the purpose of ...
[i]nflicting physical injury on or terrorizing the victim or another.").
18. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (West 2007) ("Rape is an act of
sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator
... where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person
or another."). For simplicity, "rape" will be used to cover oral and anal forced
sex, as well vaginal forced sex.
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.13(1)-(2)(a) (West 2007) ("Robbery
means taking the money or other property which may be the subject of a larceny
from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or
temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or property, when in
the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in
fear . . . . If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a
firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony in the first degree.
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contributor to a murderer becoming death-eligible. This
usage is regardless of whether that contributor appears in the
definition of murder,20 or in a separate list of aggravators. It
also does not depend on whatever name the contributor is
called by, like "special circumstances" in California21 or
"aggravating factors" as in several states, like Colorado.22
Fifth, the article will encompass thirty-nine death
penalty jurisdictions: the federal government, the United
States military, and thirty-seven death penalty states.23 The
state listing excepts New York, where the death penalty
statute has been declared unconstitutional,24 but includes
New Jersey, where although the death penalty was abolished
in 2007,25 the 2004 to 2005 database contained death-eligible
20. Four states have such statutes. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.095 (West
2007) (listing the kinds of murder that constitute "Aggravated murder" and are
thus death-eligible); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007)
(listing the kinds of murder that constitute "Capital murder" and are thus
death-eligible); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (West 2007) (listing the kinds of
murder that constitute "Aggravated murder" and are thus death-eligible); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (West 2007) (listing the kinds of murder that constitute
"Capital murder" and are thus death-eligible).
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2008) ("The penalty for a defendant
who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life without parole if one or more of the following special
circumstances has been found . . ").
22. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (West 2007) ("For
purposes of this section, aggravating factors shall be the following. .. ").
23. For the statutes of each jurisdiction, see McCord, supra note 5, app. C.
The thirty-seven states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
24. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 356, 358 (N.Y. 2004). In LaValle, the
jury was instructed that it had the choice of imposing a sentence of death or life
in prison without parole; however, its decision had to be unanimous. Id. at 356.
The jury was further instructed that if a deadlock occurred, then the judge
would impose a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. Id. The court
found that "the deadlock instruction gives rise to an unconstitutionally palpable
risk that one or more jurors who cannot bear the thought that a defendant may
walk the streets again after serving 20 to 25 years will join jurors favoring
death in order to avoid the deadlock sentence." Id. at 358.
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2008); see also Death Penalty Banned in
N.J.: First State in 43 Years to Abolish Capital Punishment, CR1. TRIB., Dec. 18,
2007, at 3 ("N.J. Gov. Jon Corzine signed into law ... a measure that abolishes
the death penalty, making New Jersey the first state in more than four decades
to reject capital punishment. The bill ... replaces the death sentence with life
in prison without parole.... The measure spares eight men on the state's death
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cases.
Finally, readers should be aware that I believe the death
penalty should be abolished. Nonetheless, analyzing the
existing system and proposing improvements to it are
traditional and acceptable scholarly endeavors. I will perform
these scholarly tasks in an even-handed manner, setting my
abolitionist preference aside. In my view, however, any
changes I propose are far inferior to eliminating the death
penalty entirely.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO "DEPRAVITY FACTORS" AND
STATUTORY AGGRAVATORS
Every murder is a terrible crime, but some murders are
worse than others. What makes a murder worse than
"normal"? Before we can delineate what constitutes a
"normal," non-aggravated murder, we must first identify the
factors that make a murder worse than normal-what I will
call "depravity factors." I have identified these depravity
factors by reading thousands of news articles describing
capital homicides, in which the factors that make a case more
despicable in the eyes of the public-and therefore in the eyes
of prosecutors and juries-become clear.26 I will distinguish
depravity factors (which are numerous) from statutory
aggravators (which are fewer, even in jurisdictions that have
the most aggravators) because my analysis in Part IV will
show that one set of depravity factors plays a large de facto
role in death-eligibility despite the fact that it plays no de jure
role.
It will be useful to consider depravity factors of two sorts:
(1) motives that are more reprehensible than normal, and (2)
non-motive factors that make a murder worse than normal. A
murder can be worse than normal because it proceeds from a
more reprehensible motive, or has other factors that make it
worse than normal, or both. In the lists below, rape and
row."); Craig R. McCoy, N.J. First to Abolish Death Penalty, Cost of Appeals,
Uncertainty over Guilt Were Factors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 18, 2007, at Al
("Gov. Corzine yesterday signed into law a measure to abolish the state's death
penalty, putting New Jersey into the vanguard of the fight against capital
punishment.... New Jersey becomes the first state to remove the death penalty
from the books since the U.S. Supreme Court reinstated it in 1976.").
26. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pt. 1, where the news article sources
for each defendant are cited.
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robbery are listed under motives, while arson, burglary, and
kidnapping are listed under non-motive factors. This is a
naturally-occurring division because while there were many
cases in which rape and robbery were motives,27 there were
no cases in the two-year period in which kidnapping was the
primary motive, as it would be in a case of holding the victim
for ransom. The numerous defendants who kidnapped
invariably did so not as an end in itself, but either to further
some other crime-usually robbery or rape-or to terrorize a
woman with whom the male defendant was obsessed. Nor
was there a single case in which arson was the primary
motive, as it would be to attain insurance proceeds; rather,
the murderers who contemporaneously committed arson did
so in aid of some other crime, often by attempting to conceal
the evidence of the murder by burning the premises
containing the victim's body. And as to burglary, the legal
definition precludes finding any murderers whose primary
motive was burglary: the definition requires a motive beyond
the illegal entry of the structure, that is, to commit a felony
within2 -typically in the sample data, this was murder, rape,
or robbery.
Focusing on motives, I will characterize "normal," non-
aggravated motives collectively as "commonplace grievances."
This designation refers to relatively normal stressors to which
defendants over-respond with homicidal violence. These
commonplace grievances include problems at work, disputes
with a significant other, grudges against neighbors, and other
such issues to which all of us can relate 9 (although not
absolving the perpetrator for resorting to homicidal violence).
By contrast, there are fifteen extraordinary, more
reprehensible motives that show significantly more perversity
of character. Not surprisingly, many of these are defined as
statutory aggravating circumstances in at least some death
penalty jurisdictions." In parentheses in the list below,
27. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
29. For details regarding "commonplace grievance" cases, see McCord, supra
note 5, app. B.
30. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pts 1-3. Part 1 details where the
contemporaneous felonies are located in the jurisdictions' murder and
aggravating circumstances statutes. Id. Part 2 details where the other
depravity factors are found in those same sources. Id. Part 3 is a compendium
of all the jurisdictions' murder and aggravating circumstances statutes. Id.
[Vo1:49
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immediately after each reprehensible motive, is the figure for
how many death penalty jurisdictions have chosen to make
this motive a statutory aggravator. Six motives are
"common" in that they exist in more than half of death
penalty jurisdictions-these six are indicated in bold, and
include two of the contemporaneous felonies-to commit
robbery or rape. Also in parentheses, in italics, is a point
value of my own creation ranging from one to five, correlating
to my opinion about the relative degree of depravity of the
factor-from one as lowest to five as highest. This number
can be ignored for now-at the end of the article when I
propose an alternative model I will refer back to it, but the
numbers are affixed here so that this long list, and the one
immediately following, do not have to be reprinted at the end.
Here, then, are the fifteen more reprehensible motives:
1. To commit a robbery (34)31 (2 points)
2. For insurance, inheritance, etc. ("for pecuniary
gain") (24)32 (3 points)
3. As part of male obsession with a female (over and above
normal attachment) (0) (1 point)
4. To eliminate one side of a "love triangle;" that is, to be rid
of one significant other to be with another (0) (2 points)
5. To physically abuse a child (0) (2 points)
6. To commit rape (34)33 (3 points)
7. To escape arrest (21) 31 (2 points)
8. To escape incarceration or avoid recapture after
escape (30)31 (3 points)
9. To eliminate a witness to a crime (25)36 (2 points)
10. To retaliate against a witness or informant (12) 37 (2
points)
11. To further a criminal gang's interests (10)38 (1 point)
12. For a terroristic or otherwise anti-government reason
(17) 31 (4 points)
31. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 1.
32. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
33. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 1.
34. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
39. See id.
2009]
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13. As a hate crime because of the victim's race, ethnicity,
religion, etc. (4)40 (2 points)
14. For a thrill, and (1)41 (3 points)
15. As part of a dispute over illegal drugs (0) (1 point)
The six common motives, used as aggravating factors in
over fifty percent of jurisdictions, include:
1. To commit rape (34)42 (3 points)
2. For insurance, inheritance, etc. ("for pecuniary
gain") (24)"3 (3 points)
3. To escape incarceration or avoid recapture after
escape (30)4 (3 points)
4. To commit a robbery (34)45 (2 points)
5. To escape arrest (21)4" (2 points)
6. To eliminate a witness to a crime (25)41 (2 points)
The nine uncommon motives, used as aggravating factors
in less than 50% of jurisdictions, include:
1. For a terroristic or otherwise anti-government reason
(17)41 (4 points)
2. For a thrill (1)"9 (3 points)
3. To eliminate one side of a "love triangle;" that is, to be rid
of one significant other to be with another (0) (2 points)
4. To physically abuse a child (0) (2 points)
5. To retaliate against a witness or informant (12)50 (2
points)
6. As a hate crime because of the victim's race, ethnicity,
religion, etc. (4)1 (2 points)
7. As part of male obsession with a female (over and above
normal attachment) (0) (1 point)
8. To further a criminal gang's interests, and (10)52 (1 point)
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 1.
43. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
44. See id.
45. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 1.
46. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
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9. As part of a dispute over illegal drugs (0) (1 point)
I will not spend much time attempting to justify why
these fifteen motives are deemed to be more reprehensible
than commonplace grievances, other than to note that almost
all of them involve some element of wrongdoing beyond the
homicide itself, and almost all involve some degree of
premeditation. To most people it is intuitively obvious that
these fifteen motives are particularly reprehensible.
As to non-motive factors that make a murder worse than
normal, they are various, but limited in number, and can be
organized into six categories. As with particularly
reprehensible motives, many of these other factors constitute
statutory aggravators in at least some death penalty
jurisdictions. The number of such jurisdictions for each factor
is indicated in parentheses immediately following the factor,
with factors that constitute aggravators in more than half of
death penalty jurisdictions indicated in bold-including the
other three contemporaneous felonies, indicated in italics.
Again, my number correlating to the degree of depravity of
the factor is in parentheses in italics for later reference. The
non-motive factors include:
1. Relatively contemporaneous homicidal behavior
a. Killing more than one victim (31)"3 (5 points for
each victim after the first)
b. Attempting to kill more than one victim at about the
same time (5) " (1 point if intended victim suffers no
or minor injury; 3 points if intended victim is
seriously injured)
2. Other bad acts committed relatively contemporaneously
(that is, other than an additional murder or attempted
murder, and other than a bad act already encompassed
within the list of motives)
a. Kidnapping (33) 55 (3 points)
b. Arson (266 plus 6 others where it will often
qualify under "great risk to others")57 (2 points)
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 1.
56. See id.
57. Arson would create a great risk to others if the structure set afire has
additional persons in it besides the murder victim.
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c. Burglary (27)58 (2 points)
d. Drug dealing (17)19 (1 point)
e. Other robberies (0) (1 point)
f. Violating a protective order (5)60 (2 points)
3. Non-contemporaneous bad acts (either before the death-
eligible homicide, or after)
a. Prior or subsequent murder or manslaughter
(31)61 (5 points)
b. Conviction(s) of other violent crime(s) (24)62 (1
point for one, 2 for two, 3 for three or more)
c. A non-conviction pattern of violence (1)63 (1 point)
4. Bad behavior by a perpetrator while incarcerated
a. Killing while incarcerated (34) (4 points)
b. Committing lesser acts or threats of violence65 (0) (1
point)
c. Escaping or attempting to escape from incarceration66
(0) (2 points)
5. Victim is particularly sympathetic due to:
a. Tender age (I will use twelve-and-under as a
typical age category) (23)67 (2 points)
b. Elder status (I will use seventy-and-over as a typical
age category) (10)68 (1 point)
c. Being frail or handicapped (other than age-related)
(9)69 (1 point)
d. Being an on-duty police officer (38)7o (4 points)
58. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 1.
59. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Threats of violence while incarcerated, as used here, includes the most
typical such threat-the possession by defendant of a prison-made knife
("shank").
66. This factor refers to escaping or attempting to escape in an episode
separate from the murder for which the defendant is on trial, and thus is
distinguished from the "to escape incarceration or avoid recapture after arrest"
motive, which entails that the murder was committed during the attempt to
escape or avoid recapture.
67. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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e. Being an other on-duty government servant7'
(30) (4 points)
6. A particularly blameworthy method of homicide
commission (which I will call "bad perpetration details"),
which consists of four subcategories:
a. Hiring a killer or acting as a hired killer (38)72 (4
points)
b. An especially blameworthy physical method of killing
i. Torture involved ("heinous, atrocious, and
cruel") (32)7" (4 points)
ii. Three or more handgun wounds (0) (1 point)
iii. Using a rifle or shotgun (0) (1 point)
iv. "Execution-style" shot(s) to the head at close
range (0) (2 points)
v. Many stab wounds (0) (2 points)
vi. Slitting the throat (0) (1 point if part of many
stab wounds, 2 if not)
vii. Bludgeoning or beating or running over with a
vehicle (0) (2 points)
viii. Strangulation or suffocation (0) (2 points)
ix. Drowning (0) (2 points)
x. Poisoning (7)74 (2 points)
xi. Burning (0) (2 points)
xii. Starving (1) 71 (2 points)
c. Other factors in homicide commission indicating
mental depravity
i. Luring the victim to the homicide scene (0) (1
point)
ii. Stalking the victim (1)76 (1 point)
iii. Killing a bound victim (0) (2 points)
iv. Killing a victim who has begged to be spared (0)
(2 points)
v. Killing in the presence of a child twelve years
old or younger 77 (0) (1 point)
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. This factor assumes that the child survives so as to have to relive the
trauma.
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vi. Killing a child in the presence of a parent" (0) (2
points)
vii. Behavior or remarks showing "relishing" of the
killing (1) (2 points)
viii. Sexual perversity beyond rape (0), (2 points)
ix. Causing great risk to other potential
victims (35)79 (1 point)
x. Killing a pet animal during the crime (0) (1
point)
d. Post-homicidal blameworthy acts
i. Mutilating the corpse (4)0 (2 points)
ii. Dumping or burying the corpse (0) (1 point)
iii. Behavior or remarks demonstrating callousness
as to the killing l (0) (2 points)
Again, I will not spend much time seeking to justify why
these factors make a murder worse than normal-these
factors are intuitively aggravating.
In summary, I have listed a total of fifty-nine
aggravators, and assigned each of them point values. Note
that there are a total of nineteen aggravators from the two
lists (all listed in bold) that exist in more than half of death
penalty jurisdictions, including the five contemporaneous
felonies: arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, and robbery. The
fourteen aggravators that are not contemporaneous felonies
will hereafter be referred to as "other common aggravators."
Here they are in summary form for easy reference: (1)
insurance/inheritance motive ("pecuniary gain"), (2) to escape
arrest, (3) to escape incarceration or avoid recapture, (4) to
eliminate a witness, (5) multiple contemporaneous homicides,
(6) a prior or subsequent murder/manslaughter, (7) other
serious record of violence, (8) killing while incarcerated, (9)
victim twelve years of age or younger, (10) victim an on-duty
police officer, (11) victim another on-duty government
servant, (12) hired killer/hiring a killer, (13) torture
78. This factor assumes that the parent survives so as to have to relive the
trauma.
79. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 2.
80. See id.
81. This factor refers to actions or comments made by the murderer after
the killing indicating that the murderer took the killing lightly, or was proud of
it.
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(especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel), and (14) great risk
created to others.
Now we are in a position to identify a "normal," non-
aggravated murder. It is one in which the motive is a
commonplace grievance, and in which the perpetrator kills
only one victim, does not attempt to kill anyone else, does not
commit any other serious contemporaneous felonies, has
either no or a non-serious record of criminal violence, is not
incarcerated at the time of the killing, and has not committed
earlier serious misbehavior while incarcerated. In addition, it
is one in which the victim does not occupy a particularly
sympathetic status, the commission of the homicide is by one
or two gunshots (but not execution-style) or a couple of knife
wounds, and there are no other bad perpetration details.
It is important to note from the above lists that there is
far less than complete coverage of all the depravity factors by
statutory aggravators. In fact, many of the depravity factors
constitute statutory aggravators in few or no jurisdictions.
But even when depravity factors do not constitute statutory
aggravators, all the depravity factors are still important. As
a matter of common sense, prosecutors view the entirety of
the facts of a case and determine how "bad" it is based on how
many of the depravity factors are present, and then if they
decide it is a really bad case, look to see if there are any
statutory aggravator pegs present on which to hang a death
penalty prosecution. Further, the depravity factors continue
to have an important impact on the case throughout the
litigation. If the depravity factor constitutes a statutory
aggravator, jurors will be instructed to consider it. 82 But even
if the depravity factor does not constitute a statutory
aggravator, jurors will almost inevitably learn about all of the
depravity factors in the case, either because those factors will
be part-and-parcel of the prosecution's guilt phase proof
82. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (West 2007) (directing jurors to
determine whether statutory aggravating circumstances exist beyond a
reasonable doubt, whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the aggravating
circumstances justify a death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (West 2007) (directing the jury that "the
verdict must be death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating
circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously
finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating
circumstances").
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(motive factors and non-motive factor categories 1-2 and 4-6)
or the prosecution's penalty phase proof (non-motive factor
category 3). Most jurisdictions permit jurors to consider
depravity factors that do not constitute statutory aggravators
(so-called "nonstatutory aggravators") in making the selection
decision. 3 And even in jurisdictions that instruct jurors to
consider only statutory aggravators in making the selection
decision," surely the jurors' decision will still take all the
depravity factors into account.
There is one particular lacuna in coverage of statutory
aggravators that will become important later in this article.s5
Of the many subparts of non-motive factor category six-bad
perpetration details-only three are covered by statutory
aggravators in a significant number of jurisdictions: hired
killer/hiring a killer, torture, and great risk to others. I will
refer to bad perpetration details other than those three as
"non-statutory bad perpetration details." The omission of so
many non-statutory bad perpetration details from coverage
has a simple doctrinal explanation: such details were
intended to be captured by the Model Penal Code's widely-
adopted "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel"
aggravator, 6  but after the Supreme Court held that
83. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 320 (4th Cir. 2003)
("Once a defendant has been rendered eligible for the death penalty by the
jury's finding of a statutory aggravating factor, the use of nonstatutory
aggravating factors serves only to individualize the sentencing determination.");
State v. Middleton, 103 S.W.3d 726, 739 (Mo. 2003) (holding jury in capital
sentencing is entitled to hear any evidence that assists its decision); State v.
Carroll, 573 S.E.2d 899, 913 (N.C. 2002) (holding that state in death sentencing
proceeding is entitled to "admit any evidence that substantially supports
death"). The Supreme Court has found no constitutional bar to the
prosecution's use of nonstatutory aggravators at the penalty phase. See Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983) (holding use of nonstatutory aggravators
is proper as long as the jury finds at least one statutory aggravator).
84. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(4) ("In determining a sentence,
evidence may be presented to the jury as to any matters relating to [the ten
categories of] aggravating circumstances enumerated in § 5-4-604."); 42 PA.
CONSOL. STAT. § 9711(a)(2) ("Evidence of aggravating circumstances shall be
limited to those [eighteen categories of aggravating] circumstances specified in
subsection (c).").
85. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(h) (1980) ("The murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.").
The Commentary does not add much clarity: "Of course, virtually every murder
is heinous, but Paragraph (h) addresses the special case of a style of killing so
indicative of utter depravity that imposition of the ultimate sanction should be
considered." Id. § 210.6 cmt. 6(b). Even today, thirty-one jurisdictions have a
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aggravator to be too vague, 7 jurisdictions refined it as
synonymous with torture before death,8  and were
presumably deterred from enacting any additional
aggravators based on perpetration details for fear that such
aggravators would also run afoul of the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, the empirical analysis will reveal that non-
statutory aggravator derived from this Code provision. See McCord, supra at
note 5, app. C, pt. 5.
87. The Supreme Court began its jurisprudence relating aggravators
derived from this Code provision. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976)
(holding that an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator was
sufficiently narrowed by construction of "the conscienceless or pitiless crime
which is unnecessarily tortuous to the victim"). The Court proceeded to hold
that the aggravator, "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in
that it involved ... depravity of mind," was unconstitutionally vague without a
narrowing interpretation: "There is nothing in these few words, standing alone,
that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of
the death sentence. A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize
almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman.'
" Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980). Subsequently the Court held
that an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator was sufficiently
narrowed by a construction of a murderer who "relishes the murder, evidencing
debasement or perversion" or "shows an indifference to the suffering of the
victim and evidences a sense of pleasure in the killing." Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990). The Court's last decision held that the aggravator
"utter disregard for human life" was sufficiently narrowed by a construction of a
"killer who kills without feeling or sympathy." Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463,
471-72 (1993). The Court has not rendered another decision on the topic,
probably because all jurisdictions have revised such aggravators to require
torture before death. Sometimes this is done by statute. See McCord, supra
note 5, app. C, pt. 5. In other jurisdictions an otherwise vague aggravator like
this is saved by a narrowing judicial construction. See Scott W. Howe, Furman's
Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MICH. J. LAW REFORM 435, 453-54 (2007) ("However,
the Court has frequently upheld vague aggravating circumstances on grounds
that the narrowing constructions given them by state courts have cured the
ambiguity.").
88. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(5) (West 2007) (requiring the
murder to be "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture
or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death"); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(r) (requiring the murder to be committed "in an especially
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must
be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily
injury of the victim before death"); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
428-33 (1980) (showing that the narrowing may also be accomplished via a
narrowing judicial construction of the otherwise vague statutory language and
noting that Georgia Supreme Court had properly limited the statutory phrase
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman" in earlier cases to
torture, but had failed to do so in Godfrey's case, which rendered the phrase
unconstitutionally vague); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 570 (11th Cir. 2000)
(defining Alabama's "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" through a limiting instruction
to torture renders the aggravator sufficiently clear).
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statutory bad perpetration details loom large in the thought
processes of both prosecutors and juries.8 9
II. THE LAW OF CONTEMPORANEOUS FELONIES AS DEATH-
ELIGIBILITY AGGRAVATORS
A. A Short History of Contemporaneous Felonies and Death-
Eligibility
The legal concept that proof of an "aggravating
circumstance" is the sine qua non to render a murderer
death-eligible emerged from the debris of the United States
Supreme Court's bombshell 1972 decision in Furman v.
Georgia.9 ° A fractured five-Justice plurality found that the
virtually unlimited discretion given to juries to impose death
sentences resulted in such arbitrariness as to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.9'
Jurisdictions wishing to try to correct this arbitrariness had
to read the tea leaves of five separate opinions from the
majority Justices. Some jurisdictions divined that they
should enact mandatory death sentence statutes.2 This
reading turned out to be wrong, as the Court struck such
statutes down in 1976 and thereafter.9 3  The remaining
89. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
90. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
91. Id. Four Justices relied at least in part on the arbitrariness rationale.
See id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). The
fifth vote was provided by Justice Marshall, who argued that the death penalty
was unconstitutional under any circumstances as incompatible with evolved
standards of decency. See id. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring).
92. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 313 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[F]ollowing Furman 10 states enacted laws providing for
mandatory capital punishment.").
93. Id. at 292-93 ("The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the
United States thus reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons
convicted of a particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and
unworkably rigid. The two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency
respecting the imposition of punishment in our society - - jury determinations
and legislative enactments - - both point conclusively to the repudiation of
automatic death sentences."); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78
(1987) (striking down mandatory death sentence for a prisoner who committed
murder while under a life-without-parole sentence); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (striking down mandatory death penalty in Louisiana
statute).
20091 CONTEMPORANEOUS FELONIES 21
jurisdictions turned for inspiration to the primary then-
existing suggestion of an alternative manner of death
sentencing-the Model Penal Code. 94  The Code was
influential: not only was it promulgated by the prestigious
American Law Institute, but it was also relatively current,
having been promulgated a mere decade earlier.
Jurisdictions taking this path guessed correctly-in 1976 the
Court upheld the Code-inspired statutes in Florida,95
Georgia, 96 and Texas.97 The jurisdictions whose mandatory
94. The Code was published in its final form in 1962. It had already begun
to have some influence prior to Furman in that six states had changed to a
bifurcated trial model, although without any statutory restriction on the types
of first-degree murder that were death-eligible or any jury instructions about
how to decide on the sentence. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 &
n.19 (1971) (noting that California, Connecticut, Georgia, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Texas had such bifurcated procedures). The Code's
Commentary was published in 1980, almost two decades after the Code itself.
By that time, the foundations of the Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence were
in place. This permitted the Commentary to state: "Cumulatively, [our]
observations confirm what the 1976 plurality [in Furman] several times
implied-that Section 210.6 of the Model Code is a model for constitutional
adjudication as well as for state legislatures." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt.
12(d) (1980).
95. See Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248 (1976) (approving Florida
statute that provided for bifurcation and aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, but with judge as sentencer).
96. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (approving Georgia
statute that provided for bifurcation and aggravating and mitigating
circumstances even though the jury was given no guidance concerning how to
deal with the aggravating and mitigating evidence after finding at least one
aggravator).
97. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976). The Texas statute was
less like the Model Penal Code's model than the Georgia and Florida statutes.
The Texas statute required at least one aggravating circumstance through a
finding of guilt of capital murder, but then channeled the penalty decision-and
thus the mitigating evidence-through a set of three questions. One of those
questions was applicable to every case: it asked the jury to answer "whether
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society." See TEx. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975). Whether mitigating evidence could
properly be given weight through this question has generated decades of
litigation, some of it successful for defendants. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989) (holding that the "continuing threat" issue did not
provide for sufficient consideration of the defendant's evidence of mental
retardation). The statute was amended in 1991 to provide for unconstrained
consideration of mitigating evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. §
37.071(2)(e) (Vernon 2007) (adding the following question if the jury answers
"yes" to the other applicable questions: "Whether, taking into consideration all
of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, defendant's
character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant,
22 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:49
statutes had been struck down soon conformed in their
essentials to the Model Penal Code, as has every jurisdiction
since. Thus, the Model Penal Code proposal became the "safe
harbor" for death sentencing schemes.
One of the key characteristics of the Code's winning
template was its idea that only murderers who were more
aggravated than normal murderers should be death-eligible.98
The Code identified these "aggravating circumstances" in
eight subparts. The one pertinent to our inquiry is subpart
(e): "The murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force
or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping."9 The list
includes six felonies, but "deviate sexual intercourse by force
or threat of force" falls under this article's broad definition of
rape; thus, this aggravator is limited to the five
contemporaneous felonies with which we are concerned. It is
to the current status of the contemporaneous felonies as
aggravators that we now turn our attention.
there is sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant a
sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed").
Nonetheless, there has continued to be successful litigation by defendants who
were sentenced prior to the effective date of the statute, or who received
improper jury instructions under the amended statute. See Penry v. Johnson,
532 U.S. 782, 797-800 (2001) (holding that at the same defendant's re-
sentencing the jury instruction still did not provide for sufficient consideration
of mental retardation mitigation); see also Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S.
Ct. 1654, 1675 (2007) (holding that jury instructions on the "continuing threat"
aggravator did not provide for sufficient consideration of defendant's bad
childhood and the consequences of it).
98. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6. The Code's successful template had
two other key features. First, the Code proposed that rather than throwing the
issues of guilt/non-guilt and sentencing to the jury as part of one deliberation,
the issues should be divided: guilt should be decided in a first phase (now
known as the "guiltlinnocence phase"), and if guilt was found, the sentence
should be determined in a second phase (now known as the "penalty phase").
See id. § 210.6(2) ("[The court] shall conduct a separate proceeding to determine
whether the defendant should be sentenced for a felony of the first degree [non-
death sentence] or sentenced to death."). Second, the Code proposed that
sentencers be permitted to consider mitigating circumstances that might
counsel against a death sentence, and specified mitigators in eight subsections.
Id. § 210.6(4)(a)-(h). These three characteristics form the backbone of every
existing American death penalty scheme.
99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(e).
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B. Which Felonies Will Suffice for Death-Eligibility?
Of the thirty-nine jurisdictions, the following include the
listed contemporaneous felony as an aggravator: 00
1. Rape: 3411 (all but Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, and
South Dakota)
100. There are four statutory mechanisms by which a contemporaneous
felony can result in death-eligibility. For details of these, see McCord, supra
note 5, app. C. Here, I will merely summarize the mechanisms. By far the most
common mechanism is inclusion of a contemporaneous felony within the
definition of the degree of murder that is death-eligible (usually "first-degree"),
and also inclusion of the same contemporaneous felony as an aggravating
circumstance that will make a murderer death-eligible. In these jurisdictions,
the aggravating effect of the contemporaneous felony on death-eligibility is
primarily through guilty verdict-the finding of the contemporaneous felony as
an aggravating factor at the sentencing phase is a foregone conclusion because
it has already been found at the guilt phase.
The second mechanism, found in four jurisdictions-Oregon, Texas, Utah,
and Virginia-is inclusion of the contemporaneous felony within the definition
of death-eligible "capital" or "aggravated" murder, without requiring a further
finding of an aggravating circumstance. In these jurisdictions, the aggravating
effect of the contemporaneous felony on death-eligibility inheres exclusively in
the guilty verdict. However, because in the first mechanism the finding of the
aggravating circumstance after the finding of guilt is a foregone conclusion, the
effect of the contemporaneous felony in making the murderer death-eligible is
the same with both mechanisms.
The third mechanism, found in four jurisdictions-Kentucky, Missouri,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania-is a definition of murder in terms of an
intentional killing, without including contemporaneous felonies, but
contemporaneous felonies are included as aggravating circumstances. In these
states the aggravating effect of the contemporaneous felonies on death-
eligibility inheres exclusively in the finding of the aggravating circumstance at
the penalty phase, rather than through the guilty verdict. Again, though, the
result is the same as in the first two patterns-the finding of the
contemporaneous felony renders the defendant death-eligible.
The fourth pattern, found in three jurisdictions, is inclusion of a
contemporaneous felony within the definition of death-eligible capital murder,
but requiring an additional aggravating circumstance-and the same
contemporaneous felony will not necessarily suffice. This pattern is unlike the
first three because the finding of the contemporaneous felony does not
necessarily equate to death-eligibility. In Arkansas, the definition of capital
murder includes all five contemporaneous felonies, but only arson (sometimes,
such as when it creates a great risk to other persons) and robbery constitute
aggravating circumstances. Connecticut is more restrictive: while murder
during the commission of kidnapping or rape is within the definition of capital
murder, none of the contemporaneous felonies will suffice as an aggravating
circumstance unless the defendant had been convicted of that same felony on a
previous occasion. In New Hampshire, murder during the commission of
kidnapping or rape is within the definition of capital murder, but an additional
aggravating circumstance is required for death-eligibility, which can be arson if
it creates a great risk of death to others, or robbery.
101. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 1.
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2. Robbery: 3402 (all but Connecticut, Montana, New
Hampshire, and New Mexico)
3. Kidnapping: 3313 (all but Colorado, Kansas, Montana,
Nebraska, and South Dakota, although Virginia limits to
kidnapping for extortion or to defile the victim)
4. Arson: 26,0 plus 6 others where it will often qualify
under a separate "great risk of death to others"
aggravator. 105  Thus, there are six jurisdictions that
exclude it completely (Connecticut, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Virginia).
5. Burglary: 27106 (all but Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, South Dakota, and Virginia)
Put differently, in twenty-four jurisdictions all five
contemporaneous felonies act as aggravators: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, the federal
government, and the military. Here are the other fourteen
jurisdictions and the contemporaneous felonies they do not
use as aggravators:
1. Alabama: arson (unless via great risk to others)
2. Colorado: arson (unless via great risk to others),
burglary, kidnapping, and rape
3. Connecticut: arson, burglary, and robbery
4. Georgia: arson (unless via great risk to others) and
burglary
5. Kansas: arson (unless via great risk to others), burglary,
kidnapping, and rape
6. Maryland: burglary
7. Montana: arson, burglary, kidnapping, and robbery
8. Nebraska: arson, burglary, kidnapping, and rape
9. New Hampshire: arson, burglary, and robbery are
included in the definition of capital murder, but arson
(unless great risk to others), burglary, kidnapping, and
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 5.
106. See McCord, supra note 5, app. C, pt. 1.
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rape are not included as aggravators
10. New Mexico: arson, burglary, and robbery
11. South Carolina: arson (unless via great risk to others)
12. South Dakota: arson (unless via great risk to others),
burglary, kidnapping, and rape
13. Virginia: arson, burglary, and some kidnapping
14. Federal law: arson (unless through explosion that
destroys government property) and burglary
Significantly, nine of these fourteen jurisdictions are
inactive or barely active death penalty jurisdictions. Those
nine, followed by the most recent figure for each for its
number of death row inmates, are as follows: Colorado (2),
Connecticut (8), Kansas (9), Maryland (8), Montana (2),
Nebraska (9), New Hampshire (0), New Mexico (2), and South
Dakota (4). 107 The list includes only five active death penalty
jurisdictions: Alabama (195), Georgia (107), South Carolina
(67), Virginia (20), and the federal government (44).0
Further, the jurisdictions that include the fewest number of
contemporaneous felony aggravators are the inactive or
barely active ones (except for barely active Maryland that
excludes only burglary). Accordingly, the fact that these nine
jurisdictions do not use many contemporaneous felony
aggravators has limited impact on the nationwide
applicability of the death penalty for contemporaneous
felonies.1 °9 Thus, in every active death penalty jurisdiction a
contemporaneous kidnapping, rape, or robbery is sufficient
for death-eligibility; in all but two (Georgia and Virginia)
107. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.
FUND, DEATH ROW U.S.A. 8-9 (2007),
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/ DRUSAWinter_2007.pdf
(compiling data current through January 1, 2007).
108. See id.
109. One could argue that the very reason those jurisdictions have limited
death penalty activity is that they severely limit the use of contemporaneous
felony aggravators. Close examination would reveal, however, that these
jurisdictions do not vigorously pursue death sentences in general, and thus
their exclusion of contemporaneous felonies as aggravators is more an effect of
their lukewarm attitude toward capital punishment than it is a cause. See
William S. Lofquist, Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and Killing
Them: An Analysis of State-Level Variations in Death Penalty Intensity, 87
IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1520 (2002) (characterizing Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and South Dakota as "inactive" death
penalty jurisdictions, and Maryland and Nebraska as "active" but not
"aggressive").
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burglary will suffice; and in all but Virginia at least some
arson (when it poses a great risk to others) will suffice.
III. THE OPPOSING POSITIONS REGARDING WHETHER
CONTEMPORANEOUS FELONIES SHOULD SUFFICE AS
AGGRAVATORS FOR DEATH-ELIGIBILITY
A. The Traditional Position: Any One of the
Contemporaneous Felonies Should Suffice for Death-
Eligibility
The traditional position, represented by the Model Penal
Code and still prevailing in most death penalty jurisdictions,
is that any one of the contemporaneous felonies is enough for
death-eligibility. There are two simple explanations for this
rule.
The first explanation is history. For several centuries,
English and American law made all the contemporaneous
felonies themselves punishable by death, even without an
accompanying murder.11° While death-eligibility for burglary
and arson was largely a thing of the past by the time the
Model Penal Code was drafted, death-eligibility for
kidnapping, rape, and robbery was still on the books in many
jurisdictions, and death sentences for rape were not
uncommon."' Further, most jurisdictions at the time the
Code was drafted made these contemporaneous felonies
predicates for first-degree felony-murder, which was a death-
eligible offense. 112 Accordingly, from both the standpoints of
110. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 3 (1980) ("As of 1959, some 35
jurisdictions punished kidnapping as a capital offense, and treason and rape
were capital crimes in 25 and 21 jurisdictions, respectively. Less commonly, the
death penalty was authorized for some forms of robbery, lynching, bombing,
arson, trainwrecking, burglary, and some varieties of aggravated assault.").
111. See id. at 119 ("In the years 1930-1970, the states executed 409 persons
for rape."); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) ("Georgia juries
have thus sentenced rapists to death six times since 1973 [until the present,
1977].").
112. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 32 note 76 ("[At the time the
Code was drafted] [t]hirty-one [jurisdictions] included as first-degree murders
only those felony murders committed in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of arson, rape, robbery, and burglary, occasionally adding . . .
kidnapping. . . ."). First-degree felony-murder was a death-eligible crime in
most jurisdictions. See id. § 210.6 cmt. 4(b) at 123 ("The [Pennsylvania] Act of
1794 [which] provided that 'all murder .. .committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary shall be deemed
murder in the first degree' [and thus death-eligible] . . .proved to be extremely
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history and then-current practice, inclusion of these five
contemporaneous felonies as death-eligibility aggravators
must have seemed natural to the drafters of the Code, and
has continued to appeal to virtually every death penalty
jurisdiction in the post-Furman era.
The second explanation for the traditional position that
contemporaneous felonies should be aggravators is that all
five of them are very serious crimes in and of themselves.
Kidnapping, rape, and robbery are among the most serious
violent crimes against persons. 113 First, the personal injury
inherent in rape is probably second only to murder.14
Second, the mental trauma from all three of these crimes can
hardly be overstated, particularly with respect to kidnapping
and rape, in which the victim is typically under the unwanted
control of the criminal for a substantial period of time. Third,
as to arson and burglary, while they can sometimes be
committed without danger to persons, they are among the
most serious property crimes, and typically do have great
potential for danger to persons.
influential .... At the time the Model Code provision on capital murder was
drafted, 34 American jurisdictions had laws based closely on the original
Pennsylvania formulation." (quoting 1794 Pa. Laws, ch. 257, §§ 1-2)).
113. Sentences for rape and robbery are, on average, among the longest for
any crime other than murder. The U.S. Department of Justice has reported the
following data on sentences in state courts for the most prevalent major offenses
(expressed in the average prison sentence/time served, in months): murder
(241/147), rape (154/109), robbery (100/64), burglary (56/29), aggravated assault
(61/42), larceny (35/20), drug trafficking (60/28), drug possession (37/16), and
weapons offenses (47/30). Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Sentencing
of Convicted Felons 2004, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04lO5tab.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2008). Note that
no data were provided for kidnapping convictions. Figures from Alabama show
what is certainly true in other states-that kidnapping draws severe sentences
compared with most other felonies, as demonstrated by the following data:
murder I (401/248); rape (369/120); kidnapping I (321/127); manufacturing a
controlled substance (186/42); robbery I (243/89); burglary I (216/82); arson I
(202/84). See RESEARCH & PLANNING DIV., ALA. DEPT. OF CORR., INAMTE
STATISTICAL REPORT 10-11 (2006), available at http://www.doc.alabama.gov/
docs/AnnualRpts/2006StatisticalReport.pdf.
114. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) ("Short of homicide,
[rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.' It is also a violent crime because it
normally involves force .... Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury
to the female and can also inflict mental and psychological damage." (citations
omitted)).
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B. The Revisionist Position: None of the Contemporaneous
Felonies Should Suffice for Death-Eligibility
First the Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment (the
"Illinois Commission") in 2002,115 and then the Massachusetts
Governor's Council on Capital Punishment (the
"Massachusetts Council") in 2004,116 recommended that
contemporaneous felonies be completely eliminated as bases
for death-eligibility. We will examine the rationales of each
in turn.
The Illinois Commission recommended that eligibility
factors be limited to: (1) police officer or firefighter victim, (2)
murder at a correctional facility, (3) multiple murders, (4)
torture, and (5) murder to obstruct or retaliate for a criminal
prosecution. 117 The Illinois Commission wrote a special
section of its report on the "[e]xclusion of 'course of a felony'
eligibility factor."118 That section noted that "the long list of
[fifteen] felonies included .. .could make almost any first
degree murder death eligible." 19  The Illinois Commission
pointed out that "a statutory scheme which makes every
murderer death eligible would.., run afoul of constitutional
concerns."'2 ° The Illinois Commission then reached the core
of its argument:
Since so many first degree murders are potentially death
eligible under this factor, it lends itself to disparate
application throughout the state. This eligibility decision
is the one most likely subject to interpretation and
discretionary decision-making ....
A second reason for excluding the "course of a felony"
eligibility factor is that it is the eligibility factor which has
the greatest potential for disparities in sentencing
115. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATE OF ILL., REPORT
(2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report]
complete-report.pdf [hreinafter ILLINOIS REPORT].
116. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATE OF MASS., FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2004), available at
http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/
docs/5-3-04Governorsreportcapitalpunishment.pdf [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS REPORT].
117. See ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 115, at 67-68.
118. Id. at 72.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 72-73.
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dispositions. If the goal of the death penalty system is to
reserve the most serious punishment for the most heinous
murderers, this eligibility factor does not advance that
goal .... This means that a defendant who robs a store,
and who commits a single murder during the course of
that robbery, can be sentenced to death even if this is a
first offense and there is no substantial criminal record.
While such a defendant should be subject to a serious
punishment for taking a life, this type of offense differs
substantially from a situation where the defendant has
killed multiple times .... It is true that the "course of a
felony" eligibility factor reaches some murders which are
also heinous and brutal. However, it was the view of the
Commission members in the majority on this proposal
that it invites the possibility of excessiveness in the death
sentencing process and should therefore be eliminated as
a factor making the defendant eligible for the death
penalty.121
The Illinois Commission incorporated some items of
empirical data in Summary Table 3 of its report: 157 of 263
(59.6%) Illinois Supreme Court death penalty cases involved
death-eligibility based at least in part on a contemporaneous
felony, 122 of 263 (46%) involved multiple murder, and no
other factor identified by the Commission in a relatively short
list was involved in more than 10.6% of cases ("Child under
12, brutal & heinous"). 122  While the Illinois Commission
referred to the "long list" of eligible felonies, in fact the five
contemporaneous felonies on which we have been focusing
accounted for almost all 157 cases-only nine cases of "armed
violence" fell outside of arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape,
and robbery. 123
Likewise, the Massachusetts Council proposed a limited
number of aggravating circumstances: (1) political terrorism
involved, (2) murder to obstruct or retaliation for a criminal
prosecution, (3) torture, (4) multiple murders, (5) previous
murder conviction, and (6) murder while the defendant was
subject to a life-without-parole sentence for a prior murder. 124
121. Id.
122. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATE OF ILL.,
TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT tbl. 7 (2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/
technical-appendix/entire technical-appendix.pdf.
123. Id.
124. MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 116, at 6-7.
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The Massachusetts Council did not speak directly to its
exclusion of contemporaneous felonies, instead speaking in
more general terms regarding why it drew the boundaries of
death-eligibility narrowly. 2 5 It began with the proposition
that the death penalty should be reserved for the "worst of
the worst" murderers. 116  It then echoed the Illinois
Commission's point about over-inclusion and overly-broad
discretion:
If the statutory list is overly broad, then the discretionary
decisions of prosecutors, judges, and juries must carry the
entire burden of ensuring that the death penalty is
applied narrowly and with reasonable consistency ....
The Council concluded that the burden of narrowing a
large pool of death-eligible murders down to the 'worst of
the worst' is simply too much to expect discretionary
decision-makers to handle effectively.' 27
The Massachusetts Council then made a second point:
"The same expansion of death-eligibility also contributes
directly to the serious and well-documented problem of racial
disparity in the application of the death penalty [due to] too
much discretion [so that] overt and hidden prejudices can
influence the decision."128 Thus, the Massachusetts Council
recommended the following criterion for aggravating
circumstances:
No [aggravating circumstance] should be placed on the list,
and included within the scope of death-eligibility, unless
the overwhelming majority of such murders are among the
most heinous of all crimes. In other words, the statutory
list of 'aggravating circumstances' should include only
those categories of first-degree murders in which almost
every individual case might be expected to be found by a
jury to be among the most heinous of all crimes .... If
this means that some of the most heinous individual
crimes will manage to avoid the death penalty, then so be
it-because it is far more important to ensure that the
death penalty will not be applied too broadly than it is to
ensure that every one of the most heinous crimes will be
eligible for the death penalty. 1
29
125. See id.
126. Id. at 10.
127. Id. at 10-11.
128. Id. at 11.
129. Id.
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By implication, the Massachusetts Council found that
murders involving contemporaneous felonies did not meet
that criterion.13 °  The Massachusetts Council cited no
empirical data in support of its recommendations.
1 3
'
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE REAL-WORLD
EFFECTS OF CONTEMPORANEOUS FELONIES AS AGGRAVATORS,
AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
The recommendations of the Illinois Commission and the
Massachusetts Council represent invitations to a bold
departure from the well-entrenched traditional position. But
neither the Illinois Commission nor the Massachusetts
Council did any significant empirical work to predict the real-
world impact their recommendations would have on death-
eligibility. I will attempt to rectify this gap in knowledge.
A. Empirical Data of Death-Eligible Murders
The database presented for analysis consists of
information about a large sample of death-eligible murderers
whose sentences were decided in 2004 to 2005-a total of
1128 of them, including all of the 286 defendants sentenced to
death, plus 218 spared by juries and 624 spared by plea-
bargains. 32 Essentially, I found as many such murderers as I
could, found as much information as I could about each, and
worked and re-worked a list of depravity factors until I had a
set that permitted us to code every depravity factor found in
any case. I then used that set of factors to code each of the
1128 defendants for the depravity factors and input each
defendant into a spreadsheet that permitted me to pull out
the needed data and statistics.133  Here are the pertinent
130. See MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 116.
131. See id.
132. I found defendants who had been sentenced to death by comparing
name-by-name about 3200 death-sentenced prisoners in succeeding quarterly
reports of Death Row USA (DRUSA). If a new name appeared, it meant that
the defendant had joined the ranks of the death-sentenced. Also, DRUSA
brackets the names of inmates whose sentences have been reversed; thus, if an
inmate's name became unbracketed in a succeeding report, it meant the inmate
had either been re-sentenced to death (which counted for my purposes) or the
death sentence had been reinstated by an appellate court (which did not count
because it was not a new death sentence, but rather one that had been imposed
years earlier outside the 2004-2005 time frame).
133. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pt. 2, which is comprised of a
"depravity factor sheet" for each defendant.
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results. 134 Since the accompanying data for the footnotes in
this part are best presented as lists of numbers extracted
from a spreadsheet, the footnotes will reference an on-line
Appendix in which these lists can be viewed.
The starting point for the analysis is the prevalence of
defendants who committed contemporaneous felonies. As
shown in figure 1 below, of the 1128 defendants, 708 (63%)
committed at least one of the contemporaneous felonies while
420 (37%) did not. 135
None
420
37%
AeO
Figure 1. Contemporaneous felonies committed: the
proportion of death-eligible defendants who committed
at least one contemporaneous felony.
Among the 286 death-sentenced defendants, 209 (73%)
committed at least one contemporaneous felony;136 among the
218 defendants spared by sentencers, 131 did so (60%); 137 and
among the 624 defendants who were spared by prosecutors'
plea-bargains, 366 did so (59%).13' Thus, the prevalence of
defendants who committed contemporaneous felonies is well
above half, both in the overall total and within each of the
three sub-groups.
The prevalence of each of the contemporaneous felonies
134. The data are imperfect because there was no comprehensive way to find
all the cases where sentencers and prosecutors spared defendants, and because
there is no guarantee that all the depravity factors were mentioned in the news
articles. Still, the data are as good as can be obtained, and of sufficient quantity
and quality as to justify the use I make of them.
135. See McCord, supra note 5, app. D.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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individually is shown in graph form below. The figures
dramatically show the prevalence of robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, and rape-but not arson. Note that the total of
these figures far exceeds the 708 defendants who committed
contemporaneous felonies because so many defendants-as I
will explore shortly-committed multiple contemporaneous
felonies. The prevalence of the other typical aggravators
identified above is included for comparison in figure 2 below.
Robbery*
Multiple murders
Burglary'
Violent non-homicidal record
Victim 12ycars or younger
Kidnapping'
Rape"
To conceal a crime
Murder for hire
Prior murder conviction
For pecuniary gain (not robbery)
Police officer victim
Great risk to others
To escape arrest
Arson'
Ileinous through torture
Bya prisoner
To escape incarceration
Gov't victim (not police officer)
369
264
191
163
154
125
66
48
47
44
43
38
35
35
28
a 9
.7
16
Figure 2. Prevalence of typical statutory aggravators
for death-eligible murders. The most common
aggravators are listed toward the top.
Contemporaneous felonies are indicated with an
asterisk.
Thus, robbery (445), burglary (264), kidnapping (154),
and rape (125) are first, third, sixth, and seventh in frequency
of occurrence of the most-codified aggravators, with only
multiple murders (369), violent non-homicide record (191),
and victim twelve years or younger (163) also breaking into
triple figures.
Another perspective emphatically shows the prevalence
of robbery and rape-but not arson, burglary, and
kidnapping-as motives for death-eligible offenses. Below are
figures for the prevalence of the fifteen particularly
blameworthy motives, and the "commonplace grievances"
motive. Note that these figures do not add up to the 1128
34 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:49
total defendants for several reasons. First, there were 103
murderers whose motives were unknown because of
insufficient information, 139  23 I classified as without
discernible motive because they were deranged by mental
illness, 140 and 5 I classified as without discernible motive
because they were deranged by intoxication,1 4 1 for a total of
131 "motiveless" defendants. Second, even after subtracting
those 131 defendants, the number of motives (1171) is more
than the number of defendants (1128) because some
defendants had more than one motive. Again, the data are
presented in graph form below in figure 3.
Robbery* 445
Commonplace greivances 153
Rape* 12S
Maleobsessionwith female 95
To conceal a crime 1 1166
Child abuse 63
Insurance, inheritance, etc. 44
Gang furtherance or retaliation 41
Drug dispute 38
Escape arrest =35
Retaliate against witness M 25
Hate crime Nli
Love triangle 09
Terrorism 18
Escape incarceration 17
Thrill 16
Figure 3. Prevalence of typical motives for death-
eligible murders. The most common motives are listed
toward the top. Contemporaneous felonies are
indicated with an asterisk.
These figures demonstrate that robbery is by far the most
common motive involved in murders that become death-
eligible, appearing almost three times as often as the next-
most common motive, and rape is third in prevalence.
The data enables us to address the question crucial to
this article: what percentages and what kinds of defendants
would escape death-eligibility if the contemporaneous-felony-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See McCord, supra note 5, app. D.
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elimination position espoused by the Illinois Commission and
the Massachusetts Council were adopted nationwide? The
database contains a large number of murderers who
represent an excellent cross-section of death-eligible
defendants. There is no reason to believe that the database is
atypical of the kinds of defendants who will recur in any
succeeding time period. Thus, an analysis of which
defendants would have been excluded from death-eligibility in
the 2004-2005 database should quite accurately predict the
real-world effects that would flow from eliminating
contemporaneous felonies as death-eligibility aggravators.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that each death
penalty jurisdiction has its own set of aggravators, although
many of the aggravators are common to many jurisdictions.
Because I am assaying a nationwide analysis of general
application, I will employ a simplifying rubric: a hypothetical
set of aggravators consisting of only the other fourteen
common aggravators earlier identified. 142 This set, while
hypothetical, closely resembles the actual aggravating
circumstances that exist in many jurisdictions, minus the
contemporaneous felonies.
Recall that 708 of the 1128 defendants committed at least
one contemporaneous felony.143 As shown in figure 4 below, of
those 708 defendants, 393 (56%) would still have been death-
eligible because their cases presented one of the other typical
aggravators, such as torture or committed to escape arrest. 144
That leaves 315 defendants (44%) who would have been
excluded from death-eligibility because their eligibility rested
on a contemporaneous felony without any of the other typical
aggravators. 145
142. See supra the factors in bold typeface in the text accompanying notes
31-79, excluding the five contemporaneous felonies.
143. See supra text accompanying note 135.
144. See McCord, supra note 5, app. D.
145. Id.
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Not
death-
eligible
315
44%
Figure 4. Proportion of defendants eliminated from
death eligibility by eliminating contemporaneous
felonies.
The exclusion breakdown by crime is set out below. Note
that the number of excluded defendants for the five crimes
adds up to more than 315 because many of the eliminated
defendants committed more than one contemporaneous felony
and are thus included in the count for more than one of the
felonies. It would, however, be double-counting to exclude
them more than once. The raw numbers of defendants who
would have been excluded from death-eligibility before
deleting the duplications are as follows: 13 of 35 arsonists
(37%);146 92 of 264 burglars (35%);147 54 of 154 kidnappers
(35%);48 40 of 125 rapists (32%);" 9 and 239 of 445 robbers
(53%).15° After eliminating duplications, the 315 exclusions
from death-eligibility under this system represents 28% of the
1128 defendants listed in the database. Certainly the change
recommended by the Illinois and Massachusetts panels,
which would eliminate more than one-quarter of death-
eligible defendants, would be a very significant one.
As to the three sub-groups in the database, the 315
defendants excluded from death-eligibility under this system
break down as shown in figure 5: 49 death-sentenced, 151 61
sentencer-spared, 152 and 205 prosecutor-spared through plea-
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See McCord, supra note 5, app. D.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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bargain. 1)8
Figure 5. Eliminated defendants by category.
The 49 defendants excluded from among the 286 death-
sentenced, constitute 17% of the defendants sentenced to
death during that two-year span-certainly a significant
percentage although perhaps not as great as proponents of
eliminating contemporaneous felonies as aggravators might
have guessed. The exclusion of 61 sentencer-spared from
among 218 sentencer-spared defendants constitutes 30%
exclusion, and the exclusion of 205 defendants spared by
prosecutors through plea bargains from among 624
constitutes 33% exclusion, also significant exclusion
percentages.
B. Patterns of Exclusion
Our next task is to identify any relevant patterns among
the 315 murderers excluded from death-eligibility. Three
patterns jump out from the data. The first is the prevalence
of murderers who committed multiple contemporaneous
felonies. The second pattern is the prevalence of non-
statutory bad perpetration details. And the third pattern is
that the least-depraved cases are almost exclusively ones
where robbery is the only contemporaneous felony. We will
explore each of these three patterns in detail, below;
normative analysis will be included when appropriate. For
the moment, I will accept the traditional one-aggravator-is-
sufficientoand-alloare-equal model, although it makes
153. Id.
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answering the normative questions quite problematic. Later
I will propose a model that makes answering normative
questions significantly clearer and more just.
1. Commission of Contemporaneous Felonies
The first relevant pattern evident within the 315
excluded murderers is the prevalence of defendants who
committed more than one different 5 4  contemporaneous
felony-105 of the excluded defendants (33%) fall into this
category.1 5  One committed four," 6 seventeen committed
three,'157 and eighty-seven committed two. 5 ' This squarely
raises an important normative question: should murderers
who committed multiple contemporaneous felonies be
eliminated from death-eligibility? Of the 105 multiple-
contemporaneous-felony murderers, death sentences were
imposed with some regularity (24, which means 23%).1 1 Still,
in 81 such cases (77%) either juries (in 14 cases)' or
prosecutors (in 67 cases)16 ' spared the defendants. The 23%
rate at which these 105 murderers received death sentences
is substantial enough to support, but not compel, the
conclusion that such murderers are worthy of death often
enough that they should be included within the universe of
the death-eligible. Ultimately, though, the normative
question cannot be answered by data analysis alone.
While normative questions typically admit of no
definitive answers, I believe the better answer under the one-
aggravator-is-sufficient-and-all-are-equal model is that it
would be unjust to exclude multiple-contemporaneous-felony
murderers from death-eligibility. Such murderers surely
rank toward the top of the depravity heap in the eyes of the
154. If a defendant committed multiple instances of the same
contemporaneous felony, such as by kidnapping two victims contemporaneously,
the coding sheet only permitted coding for the presence of "kidnapping," since
that was all that was needed for the main purpose of this article to ascertain
whether the felony was present in the case. Thus, there are more defendants in
the database who committed multiple contemporaneous felonies than the
number who committed different contemporaneous felonies.
155. See McCord, supra note 5, app. D.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See McCord, supra note 5, app. D.
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public. Certainly this is true for defendants who committed
three or four contemporaneous felonies, but even for those
who commit two, it seems that any of the ten possible
permutations of two felonies is sufficiently blameworthy to
put the murderer toward the upper end of the scale.
Multiple-contemporaneous-felony murderers are likely
encompassed within the category the Illinois Commission had
in mind when it noted, with apparent regret, "It is true that
the 'course of a felony' eligibility factor reaches some murders
which are also heinous and brutal,"'62 and to which the
Massachusetts Council referred in stating, "If [eliminating
several traditional aggravators, including contemporaneous
felonies] means that some of the most heinous individual
crimes will manage to avoid the death penalty, then so be it..
S.,"163 But those panels were too simplistic in their analysis
when it comes to multiple-contemporaneous-felony
murderers. It is a simple drafting task to preserve death-
eligibility for murderers who commit multiple
contemporaneous felonies, while excluding those who commit
only one. A legislature could eliminate the individual
contemporaneous felonies as aggravators, and replace them
with this aggravator:
As part of the same criminal episode as the murder for
which the defendant is charged, the defendant committed
any two or more of the following crimes: arson, burglary,
kidnapping, rape, or robbery; or committed multiple
instances of the same one of these crimes; provided,
however, that robbing more than one victim
simultaneously does not qualify. 164
Including multiple-contemporaneous-felony murderers as
162. ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 115, at 73.
163. MASSACHUSETTs REPORT, supra note 116, at 11.
164. The law of many jurisdictions holds that a charge can be brought as to
each victim of a multiple victim robbery. See, e.g., People v. Williams, No.
271870, 2008 WL 183088, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2008) (holding that the
"unit of prosecution" for robbery is by the person robbed, and thus multiple
counts of robbery are permissible when multiple victims are robbed in the same
incident); Williams v. State, 240 S.W.2d 293, 300 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) ("In
Texas, the allowable unit of prosecution for an assaultive offense such as
robbery is per victim." (citation omitted)); State v. Phelps, No. 25879-3-Ill, 2008
WL 152600, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2008) (stating that in Washington, "a
conviction on one count of robbery may result from each separate taking of
property from each person"). This would be inappropriate double-counting for
death-eligibility purposes, however.
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death-eligible under an aggravator like this is preferable to
eliminating those murderers from death-eligibility. The
multiple-contemporaneous-felony aggravator just proposed is,
in fact, a simplistic foretaste of the more nuanced multi-factor
model that will be proposed later.
2. Non-Statutory Bad Perpetration Details
The second relevant pattern evidenced by the 315
excluded murderers is the prevalence of non-statutory bad
perpetration details: 249 of the 315 excluded murderers (79%)
presented bad perpetration details; 66 did not (21%).165 This
is shown in figure 6 below.
Not pesert
66
Figure 6. Presence of non-statutory bad perpetration
details.
This brings home the point from earlier in the article that
non-statutory bad perpetration details weigh heavily in
prosecutor's decisions to pursue death sentences.16 Of these
249, 94 committed more than one contemporaneous felony.167
I will not examine these 94 further because I have already
expressed the belief that multiple-contemporaneous-felony
murderers should be death-eligible, with or without bad
perpetration details. The focus here will be on the 155 single-
contemporaneous felony murderers with non-statutory bad
perpetration details. Whether such murderers should be
excluded from death-eligibility is perplexing. Twenty such
defendants received death sentences, certainly a significant
165. See McCord, supra note 5, app. F.
166. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
167. Id.
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number.16 This, however, constitutes only thirteen percent of
the total of 155, which is probably toward the margin of the
range at which murderers are worthy of death often enough
that they should be included within the universe of the death-
eligible. But again, empirical evidence alone does not
definitively answer the normative question.
From a policy standpoint, non-statutory bad perpetration
details, particularly if they are multiple, often cause the
conscience of the community to rank such murderers high on
the depravity scale. But if one believes-as I do169-the
Illinois and Massachusetts panels' position that excess
prosecutorial discretion is a vice in death sentencing, then
permitting prosecutors to use non-statutory bad perpetration
details as a mechanism of virtually statutory significance for
selecting single-contemporaneous felony murderers against
whom to seek death sentences is particularly suspect. In
doing so, prosecutors rely on an unregulated, "stealth" non-
statutory aggravator. I frankly do not see how to rationally
resolve this issue within the current one-aggravator-is-
sufficient-and-all-are-equal model. Accordingly, I will punt
this normative question to the model proposed at the end of
this article, which gives explicit weight to bad perpetration
details while properly checking unbridled prosecutorial
discretion.
3. Robbery as the Only Contemporaneous Felony
The third pattern from the data is that the least
depraved cases among contemporaneous felony murderers are
almost exclusively ones where robbery is the only
contemporaneous felony. As to the other four
contemporaneous felonies, every single arsonist, kidnapper,
rapist, and all but one burglar presented at least one other
depravity factor.17 By contrast, twenty-nine robbers
presented no other depravity factor other than the robbery
itself, and two of these received death sentences.171
Normatively, these twenty-nine robber-murderers were
168. Id.
169. Indeed, I will argue that those panels' proposals do not go nearly far
enough in seeking to constrain it. See infra notes 182-98 and accompanying
text.
170. See McCord, supra note 5, app. G.
171. Id.
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simply not depraved enough to have been included within the
pool of death-eligibility, and the two death sentences within
that category were wrongly imposed. An otherwise non-
depraved murder during a robbery is not among the "worst of
the worst" murders for which death should be an option.172
Yet under the current one-aggravator-is-sufficient-and-all-
are-equal model, there is no way to constrain prosecutorial
discretion in order to limit the pursuit of death sentences to
those robber-murderers who present other depravity factors.
C. Proposals by Other Scholars
There are clearly significant detriments in permitting
prosecutors to pursue death sentences in non-depraved cases
even if (as is usually true) death sentences do not result.
These detriments include expending excess resources
attributable to capital cases on defendants who should not be
considered for the penalty, unnecessarily fraying the nerves
of all concerned, and giving prosecutors improper leverage in
plea-bargaining by being able to allege death-eligibility in an
insufficiently depraved case. The alternative model I am
about to propose provides the needed constraint on
prosecutors while still permitting appropriate consideration
of all depravity factors. But first we need to assess two
proposals from other scholars that would eliminate only some
of the contemporaneous felonies as death-eligibility
aggravators.
Professor Steven Shatz has argued for eliminating
burglary as an aggravator, 173 although he makes the odd
move of combining the robbery and burglary into a
"robbery/burglary" category that he argues should be
eliminated.174 He believes robbery so predominates as the
172. See infra notes 173 and 180 and accompanying text.
173. See Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and
Ordinary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 719, 770 (2007) ("A substantial first step in addressing this overbreadth [of
coverage of statutory aggravators] would be the recognition of the constitutional
infirmity of making death-eligible ordinary robbery-burglary murderers: They
are, in every respect, the 'average' murderers....").
174. Id. at 723 ("Because the two underlying felonies, robbery and burglary,
are generally committed with similar motives and intentions-a substantial
proportion of robberies are committed indoors and therefore involve a burglary,
and a majority of burglaries are committed for the purpose of theft and become
robberies or attempted robberies when force (in this context, lethal force) is
used-they will be treated together throughout this Article.").
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goal of burglars that the two can be combined. 17 5 I disagree
with combining the two crimes for data analysis purposes. In
the sample, robbery was certainly the predominant motive of
burglars, but there were plenty of burglars whose goal was
some other felony-typically murder, kidnapping, or rape-
while, conversely, many robbers did not commit burglary. 17 6
As a practical matter, though, eliminating burglary would
have minimal real-world impact because most burglars would
still be death-eligible either because they committed other
contemporaneous felonies or because other typical
aggravators were present. 7 Ultimately, I do not strongly
advocate a position on the elimination of burglary because of
this minor effect. And although nobody has proposed it, I
would likewise take no position on the elimination of arson as
an aggravator-its elimination would have even a smaller
real-world effect than eliminating burglary. 78  The three
felonies that really matter for death-eligibility purposes are
kidnapping, rape, and robbery.
Professor Shatz has proposed eliminating robbery as an
aggravator via his suggestion to eliminate
"robbery/burglary."179  Further, one of the few academic
supporters of the death penalty, Professor Robert Blecker,
has endorsed the idea of eliminating death-eligibility for some
robbers who are otherwise non-depraved.8 ° Unlike
eliminating arson or burglary, eliminating robbery would
exclude a large number of murderers from death-eligibility.
175. Id.
176. By examining McCord, supra note 5, app. D, we can ascertain that 143
of 448 robbers also committed burglary, and 143 of 264 burglars also committed
robbery.
177. See McCord, supra note 5, app. F.
178. Id.
179. See Shatz, supra note 173, at 770.
180. See Symposium, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who
Deserves Death? 24 PACE L. REV. 107, 176 (2003) ("But, the majority of people
on death row are robber-murderers, who did not commit the kind of killings that
qualify them as 'the worst of the worst.' "). According to the database, I doubt
Professor Blecker's assertion that "a majority" of murderers on death row
committed robbery, although certainly a substantial percentage of them did.
Nor can I tell exactly how Professor Blecker would limit the death penalty for
robber-murderers. Given that he is a death penalty supporter, I doubt that he
would support the contemporaneous-felony-elimination position of the Illinois
Commission and the Massachusetts Council. My best guess is that Professor
Blecker believes that robber-murderers who present little or no depravity
factors besides the robbery should not be death-eligible.
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Several arguments for eliminating robbery are enticing.
First, there is a strong moral argument that kidnapping and
rape are more depraved crimes than robbery. ' Kidnapping
and rape almost always cause more harm because they make
significantly greater intrusions on the victim's bodily
autonomy than almost any robbery. Second, eliminating
robbery would eliminate some murderers who should
definitely be excluded from death-eligibility-that is, the
least-depraved murderers in the sample consisted almost
exclusively of single-contemporaneous-felony robbers who
presented no other depravity factors.8 2 Third, even if robbery
were eliminated, many of the worst robbers would still be
death-eligible because of other typical aggravators. But the
downside of eliminating robbery is that it would also
eliminate a significant number of murderers who arguably
should be death-eligible-primarily single-contemporaneous
felony robbers with multiple bad perpetration details. Of the
options so far mentioned, the proposed multiple-
contemporaneous-felony aggravator is preferable to
eliminating robbery entirely. Without that option, if forced to
choose between retaining robbery and eliminating it, I would
side with Professor Shatz for eliminating it because the
benefits of doing so probably outweigh the costs. We need not
be forced to such a choice, however, because a better option
can be created.
V. A PROPOSED MULTI-FACTOR-WEIGHTED-THRESHOLD
MODEL
My suggested alternative to the current one-aggravator-
is-sufficient-and-all-are-equal model is a multi-factor,
weighted system with a threshold for death-eligibility.
Specifically, a legislature should take every depravity factor
set forth at the beginning of this article,"' including
contemporaneous felonies and all the bad perpetration
details, and assign each a point value. The legislature should
then set a threshold for points a murderer would have to
accrue in order to be death-eligible." 4 Under this model, a
181. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 31-81 and accompanying text.
184. I believe a system seeking the worst of the worst would set a threshold
that would require multiple "hits" on depravity factors to reach the necessary
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prosecutor could make a predictive eligibility decision based
on what point values for depravity factors the prosecutor
thinks could be proven, which the prosecutor usually knows
quite early in the case. The jury would make the actual
eligibility decision in the penalty phase by determining which
depravity factors had been proven in answers to a series of
special interrogatories on the verdict form. If the jury found
sufficient points to confer eligibility, then the jury would
proceed to the selection decision.185  If the jury found
insufficient points, the defendant would receive an
alternative non-death sentence-in most jurisdictions, life-
without-parole.18 6  Because it contains an exhaustive list of
depravity factors with point values calibrated to the degree of
depravity of the factor, this model would provide a much more
complete and accurate assessment of the aggravation level of
the case than the current one-aggravator-is-sufficient-and-all-
are-equal model, which is one-dimensional by comparison.
Additionally, the threshold point total would ensure that only
the "worst of the worst" would reach death-eligibility. The
model would not require any change to the familiar and
constitutionally-accepted bifurcated trial.8 7 Nor would the
threshold, although it would be supportable to assign a point value to certain
depravity factors such that they are sufficient for death-eligibility in and of
themselves-the two most likely candidates in my view would be a prior murder
conviction and multiple homicides.
185. I see significant advantages, however, to giving the selection decision to
a judge rather than a jury. See infra note 187.
186. Typically, this would be a life-without-parole ("LWOP") sentence. See
Catherine Appleton & Brent Grover, The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole,
47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 597, 598 (2007) ("The vast majority of U.S. states that
retain the death penalty mandate that anyone not sentenced to death for capital
or first-degree murder--the crimes that normally carry the death penalty in the
United States--shall serve a sentence of LWOP."); Jeffrey Fagan, Death and
Deterrence Redux: Science, Law, and Causal Reasoning on Capital Punishment,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 269 (2006) ("Of the thirty-eight states that currently
have valid death penalty statutes, thirty-seven also have LWOP statutes. Only
New Mexico does not.").
187. It would probably be wise, however, to institute a trifurcated proceeding
that requires the jury to return the completed depravity factor special
interrogatories in open court and take a break for the judge to determine
whether they should retire again to address the death-selection question. This
trifurcation would be minor because no additional evidence or argument by
counsel would need to be presented. Alternatively, if the jurisdiction preferred
a judge to make the selection decision, the jury could be dismissed after
answering the eligibility question. As I have argued previously, there is much
to recommend giving the selection decision to a judge. See David McCord, An
Open Letter to Governor George Ryan Concerning How to Fix the Death Penalty
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model run afoul of the rather loose constitutional mandate
that only murderers who are worse than "normal" can be
death-eligible;' instead, it would fulfill that mandate much
better than the traditional system.
I will apply my model to ten murderers from the
database to illustrate how it would operate. Assume the
legislature has assigned the point values from one to five for
each depravity factor as suggested earlier,8 9 and has set a
threshold point value of seven that a defendant must accrue
in order to be death-eligible. We will begin with two easy
cases that far surpass the threshold point value.
1. Defendant and a cohort robbed a convenience store, and
then kidnapped two store clerks and a customer.
Defendant and the cohort raped one of the clerks, and
then shot all three victims execution-style. One of the
victims died; the other two survived.' 9°
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for two
attempted murders with serious injury, 2 x 3 = 6; for rape,
3; for robbery, 2; for three kidnappings, 3 x 3 = 9; and for
an execution-style shot to the head, 2. This totals 22, and
would make the defendant death-eligible by a wide
margin.
2. During a home-invasion burglary and robbery, defendant
beat to death the homeowners, ages eighty-four and
eighty-two. 9'
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for an
additional murder, 5; for robbery, 2; for burglary, 2; for
two bludgeoning, 2 x 2 = 4; and for two victims seventy or
older, 2 x 1 = 2. This totals 15, and would make the
defendant death-eligible by a wide margin.
These two murderers are clearly among the "worst of the
worst," and the model easily identifies them as such.
System, 32 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. 451, 463 (2001) ("[S]ince jurors are not well
trained, they should be eliminated from the sentencing process. Many of the
errors in capital cases arise from ill-fated efforts to educate jurors concerning
their sentencing duties.").
188. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 31-81 and accompanying text.
190. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: DS-04-TX-02.
191. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: DS-04-AL-08.
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Now here are six hard cases that present only one
contemporaneous felony and other depravity factors, but
without any of the other common aggravators. Predictably,
these cases are close to the threshold point value for death-
eligibility.
1. An arson case: The defendant bound and gagged his ex-
wife and a seventy-seven-year-old man in the man's
mobile home and threatened them with a knife before
throwing kerosene on the victims and the home and
setting fire to the trailer. The man died from intense heat
and from breathing the fire. The ex-wife was critically
wounded, and had her legs amputated.'92
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for
attempted murder with serious injury, 3; for arson, 2; for
victim seventy or older, 1; for burning to death, 2; and for
victim bound, 2. This totals 10, which would make the
defendant death-eligible.
2. A burglary case: Defendant was under a restraining
order as to his ex-wife. He broke into her home in the
middle of the night and took her from her bed, while she
slept with the couple's daughter. Defendant led her to
the garage where he shot her thirteen times. The
couple's eight-year-old son was awake the entire time
and he called 911 to report the shooting.' 9'
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for
burglary, 2; for violating a protective order, 2; for three or
more handgun wounds, 1; and for killing in presence of a
child twelve or younger, 1. This totals 6, which would
make the defendant not death-eligible.
3. A kidnapping case: the defendant kidnapped, beat,
bound, stripped, and shot the victim in connection with a
drug dispute, and then dumped the body.
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for
drug dispute motive, 1; for kidnapping, 3; for beating, 2;
for victim bound, 2; and for dumping the corpse, 1. This
totals 9, which would make the defendant death-
192. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: DS-05-TN-02.
193. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: PS-04-OR-08.
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eligible.
4. A rape case: Defendant beat and raped the victim, then
strangled her. He then put her semi-nude body in the
trunk of a car, hauled it to a vacant lot and poured
gasoline on it, then set it on fire. 194
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for
rape, 3; for beating, 2; for strangulation, 2; and for
mutilating the corpse, 2. This totals 9, which would make
the defendant death-eligible.
5. A robbery case: The defendant needed money and a car to
go see his pregnant ex-girlfriend. He lured the victim to
a field on the pretext of test-firing a shotgun defendant
claimed he might buy. Defendant then shot the victim in
the abdomen with the shotgun, then in the side as the
victim was trying to flee, and then in the face as the
victim was lying on his back. Defendant then stole the
victim's car. 195
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for
robbery, 2; for using a rifle or shotgun, 1; for execution-
style shot to the head, 2; and for luring the victim to the
homicide scene, 1. This totals 6, which would make the
defendant not death-eligible.
6. Another robbery case: Defendant robbed a pharmacy. He
shot the manager in the leg to "soften him up," then
dragged him to the store safe. The manager opened the
safe while pleading for his life. Defendant then shot him
once in the head, killing him. 196
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for
robbery, 2; for execution-style shot to the head, 2; and for
killing a victim who begged to be spared, 2. This totals 6,
which would make the defendant not death-eligible.
Finally, here are two easy cases that fall well short of the
threshold for death-eligibility.
194. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: SS-04-AR-02.
195. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: DS-04-NC-04.
196. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: DS-04-PA-04.
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1. A third robbery case: Defendant robbed a pawnshop. He
took the clerk to a back room and shot him in the back,
then stood over him and fired another shot execution-
style.197
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for
robbery, 2; and for execution-style shot to the head, 2.
This totals 4, which makes the defendant not death-
eligible.
2. A fourth robbery case: defendant and a cohort were
attempting to rob a bank, and provoked a shootout
during which a bank security guard was shot and
killed.19
This defendant would accrue points as follows: for
robbery, 2. This totals 2, which makes the defendant not
death-eligible.
I do not claim to have any special dispensation of
knowledge about what point value should be assigned to each
factor, nor about what the threshold point value should be. If
the model does not come to the right outcome for particular
fact patterns, then the point values should be adjusted. The
argument is not based on particular point values, but on the
contention that this model provides a better mechanism for
attempting to identify the "worst of the worst" murderers
than either of the competing models. Under the traditional
one-aggravator-is-sufficient-and-all-are-equal model, all ten
of these murderers would be death-eligible based on a
contemporaneous felony alone, and prosecutors would have
unbridled discretion to choose which ones to pursue as death
penalty cases. Under the contemporaneous-felony-
elimination model proposed by the Illinois Commission and
the Massachusetts Council, none of these defendants would
be death-eligible despite their contemporaneous felonies and
other depravity factors. The blue-ribbon panels certainly
make a powerful point that excess prosecutorial discretion in
capital cases leads to an unacceptable potential for
arbitrariness. But those panels' proposed solution-to reduce
the number of aggravators-is flawed because it accepts the
197. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: SS-04-FD-10.
198. See McCord, supra note 5, app. A, pts. 1-2: DS-05-OK-08.
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traditional system's flawed premise that death-eligibility for
the "worst of the worst" can be correctly conferred through
finding just a single aggravator from an equally-weighted list.
I advocate moving in an entirely different direction:
expanding the number of depravity factors dramatically, but
requiring an accumulation of them from a weighted list to
establish death-eligibility.
CONCLUSION
If I were forced to choose between those blue-ribbon
panels' proposed model that entirely eliminates
contemporaneous felonies as death-eligibility aggravators,
and the traditional model, I would opt for the traditional
model. The wholesale exclusion of contemporaneous-felony
murderers would eliminate too many truly depraved
murderers, particularly those who commit multiple
contemporaneous felonies, and those who commit murders
with multiple bad perpetration details. While the traditional
system confers death-eligibility for contemporaneous felonies
far too broadly, usually the good sense of prosecutors and
juries avoids imposing death sentences on truly non-depraved
defendants, albeit with a great deal of inefficiency due to the
over-inclusion of those who are death-eligible. There is no
need, however, for a forced choice between the flawed
traditional model and the even more flawed model proposed
by the Illinois Commission and Massachusetts Council. The
proposed multi-factor-weighted-threshold model correlates
much more strongly with justice, and could be simply
implemented. Perhaps the next blue-ribbon panel will
consider it.
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